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DETERMINING WHETHER CONVENTION TRIPS ARE A
PERSONAL OR BUSINESS EXPENSE
Rudolph v. United States
291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961)
A Texas insurance agent qualified to attend his company's convention
in New York City by selling the requisite amount of insurance. The trip
lasted five or six days, and of this time a morning meeting and a luncheon
were devoted to business activities. The remaining time was spent traveling,
renewing old acquaintances, sightseeing, and leisure. A majority of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayer realized additional
income when his company paid all the expenses for him and his wife to
attend the convention, and that the taxpayer could not deduct the cost of the
trip as a business expense. 1
The majority and the dissent agreed that the amount paid by the
employer for the trip was income to the taxpayer. 2 The debated issue was
whether the taxpayer could deduct the costs of the convention as an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense.3 While most decisions concerning convention
expenses relate to deductions by professional men4 or corporations,5 it is
clear that similar deductions are allowable to persons who are employees. 6
If convention expenditures are to be considered a business expense, the
primary purpose of the trip, obviously, must be business, not pleasure. 7 The
Regulation provides:
1 Rudolph v. United States, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961), affirming per curiam, 189
F. Supp. 2 (NJ). Texas 1960). The appellate court referred to Patterson v. Thomas,
289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961), a case with practically identical facts, for the applicable
law. Justice Brown dissented in both of the Court of Appeals' decisions.
2 The receipt of a benefit in a form other than cash may constitute income to the
taxpayer. See Commission v. Lobue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), stock options; United States
v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821 (1950), annuities.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162 (a) (2): "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on any trade or business including ... (2) traveling expenses (including the entire
amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a
trade or business."
4 Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931); Ellis v. Burnet, 15 B.T.A. 1075 (1929),
aff'd, 50 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Jay N. Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926).
5 Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1097 (1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Finkenburg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.C. 973 (1951).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958); Rita M. Callinan, 12 Tax Ct. Mem. 170 (1953);
Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927); Rev. Rul. 60-16, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 58;
Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.08 (1960).
7 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262. If the trip is primarily of a personal nature,
transportation costs are not deductible, but any expenses incurred for business purposes
while at the destination are deductible. Treas. Reg. 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958); Stuetzer Jr.,
"New Cases on Travel, Education, Help Draw Line Between Personal and Business De-
ductions," 11 J. Taxation 346 (1959); Cbanen, "Business Trips v. Pleasure Trips," 4 Prac.
Law. 53 (October 1958). Consequently, Mr. Rudolph should have been allowed a deduc-
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The ... deduction... will depend upon whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the taxpayer's trade or business and his at-
tendance at the convention... so that he is benefiting or advancing
the interests of his trade or business by such attendance.8
Whether the cost of the trip is an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense must be determined from the taxpayer's and not the employer's stand-
point.9 To be ordinary a business expense does not have to be habitual or
recurring; it may be unique to the taxpayer.10 However, it must not be
unusual or novel in the experience of the community." Admittedly, the term
ordinary business expense is vague; its interpretion will depend upon the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.12 An expenditure is necessary
if it is appropriate, helpful or convenient to the taxpayer's business.' 3 How-
ever, rarely will the courts question the necessity of an expense by the tax-
payer.
tion for his expenses in attending the business meeting and luncheon, but the court did not
consider this. See Patterson v. Thomas, supra note 1, where such a deduction was allowed
to the taxpayer, although the court decided the trip to the convention was for personal
reasons.
8 Treas. Reg. 1.162-2(d) (1958). See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470
(1946), where the majority of the Court, in stating one of the conditions to be satisfied
before a traveling expense deduction may be taken, said, "The expense must be incurred in
pursuit of business. This means that there must be a direct connection between the ex-
penditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or his employer."
See also A. P. Reed, 35 T.C. 199 (1960); 0. G. Russel, 11.Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1952).
If the meetings actually promote the knowledge, skill, and attitude of the taxpayer,
and the primary purpose of his trip is business, he should be allowed to deduct the cost
of the convention as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Such a situation
would be analogous to allowing a taxpayer to deduct educational expenses in order to stay
abreast of current developments in his field and thereby better execute and maintain his
job. Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953). However, if the educational
expenditures are made for the purpose of obtaining a promotion or a new job, they will
be disallowed as business expenses. See Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(b) (1958).
9 For example, to increase their spirits and efficiency, an employer may give his
salesmen an all-expense-paid vacation. The expense will be deductible to the employer
[if it is not an unreasonable allowance of compensation under Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 162 (a) (1)] because such a vacation advances the interests of his trade or business.
However, the employee must treat the vacation as income and will not be allowed a
deduction, since the purpose of the trip for him is personal and not related to business.
1o Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111
(1933); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
11 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
12 The Supreme Court, in determining what is an ordinary business expense, in
Welch v. Helvering, supra note 10, at 115, said, "... the decisive distinctions are those of
degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a
ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather
a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." For an array
of cases dealing with the question of whether an expense is ordinary, see 4 Mertens,
op. cit. supra note 6, at § 25.09.
13 Welch v. Helvering, supra note 10; 4 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 25.09.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In determining if the taxpayer's trip was primarily for business or of
a personal nature, the court of appeals in Patterson v. Thomas,14 the case
upon which the majority of the court in the principal case relied, considered
the following:
(1) The amount of time devoted to business compared with the time
spent for social activities;15
(2) The place where the convention was held; 16
(3) The sponsor of the convention; 17
(4) The attitude of the employer.'
Deciding against the taxpayer on these factors, the majority of the court
in the principal case held that the expenditures were personal expenses and
could not be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Basing his conclusion on one additional factor, that Mr. Rudolph was
required by his employer to attend the convention even though the command
was in the form of an invitation,' 9 Justice Brown vigorously dissented. The
14 Supra note 1.
15 As stated, in the principal case a morning and a luncheon out of a five or six day
trip were devoted to business. The taxpayer argued in Patterson v. Thomas, supra note 1,
that much of his free time was spent in talking to company officials and other salesmen
who gave him information on improving his abilities. In answer to this issue, the
majority of the court replied that if it were not for the other factors in the case (infra
notes 16, 17, and 18), the decision would have been more difficult.
The Treas. Reg. 1.162-2(b) (2) (1958) lists only one factor in determining if a trip
is primarily personal: the proportion of time devoted to business activities. Yet, the
Regulation recognizes that this factor is not conclusive, for it says the question depends
on the facts and circumstances in each case. See Stuetzer Jr., supra note 7, at 347.
16 The convention was held in New York, while in Patterson v. Thomas, supra note
1, it was held at a Virginia resort hotel. In both cases the conventions were in states
where the employers did no business. If their primary purpose were business, such as
the education of the salesmen, the gatherings apparently could have been held nearer to
the companies' home offices, and not at such distant places. The fact that the con-
ventions were conducted at popular vacation spots made them appear to be pleasure
trips-indeed, bonuses given by the companies to their employees. See IR-Circ. No. 57-85,
June 20, 1957, 575 CCH f 6585.
17 The convention was sponsored by the taxpayer's employer, and the only partici-
pants in it were the company's employees. In addition, the taxpayer qualified to attend
by selling a required amount of insurance. These facts make the convention appear to be
really a form of remuneration.
Is The attitude of the employer was not elaborated upon in the principal case
(probably because the court wrote only a per curiam opinion), but it can be speculated
that it was similar to the viewpoint of the employer in Patterson v. Thomas, supra note
1. In the latter case, letters sent by the vice-president of the company to the manager of
the hotel were examined by the court. On such letter read, ". . . business is secondary. The
main object is to give our people a good time." This indicates that the company regarded
the trip as a bonus to its employees.
19 Rudolph v. United States, supra note 1, at 843: "[The company's] vice-president,
after stating that an agent indicating he would not attend was required to give an ex-
planation, testified that 'if he [the agent] doesn't have a proper reason it-would be
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dissenting justice felt that an employee of a large corporation is an "organ-
ization man."
Every waking hour the company's needs, the company's business,
the company's welfare is drummed into this person whose inner
satisfactions are likewise finally warped into the corporation image
through status symbols of job assignments, titles, and prerogatives.
... [T]he decision to go was compelled... as a matter of business
necessity. It is a pressure which people every day, everywhere in
America now undergo. It is ordinary in all and the worst senses 20
Because the man had to go or suffer a loss of prestige, perhaps his chance of
promotion, or even his job, Justice Brown felt this was an ordinary and
necessary business expense. 2 1
Granted that the invitation to the convention was a command, should
this fact make the expense deductible? Because the taxpayer was required to
attend, it would seem that the expenditures were "ordinary and necessary."
Yet, to deduct the cost of the trip, the expenditures must also directly advance
the interests of the taxpayer's business.22 Justice Brown was satisfied when
he found the expenses were ordinary and necessary, but he overlooked the
fact that there was not a sufficient relationship between the taxpayer's at-
tendance at the convention and his business. Actually the only connection be-
tween the trip and the taxpayer's business (other than the few hours spent
in business meetings) was that the employer required his employees to attend.
looked upon with displeasure."' Similar testimony was given by the president of the
insurance company in Patterson v. Thomas, supra note 1.
20 Patterson v. Thomas, supra note 1, at 117 and 118. See the remark by Bittker,
Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation, p. 40 (2d ed. 1961 Supp.), where he says,
"The dissenting judge, though evidently not much of an organization man himself, did
not discuss whether the deduction should have been disallowed on the ground that the
system contravened public policy, perhaps because he found it to be (in Justice Brown's
words) 'as American as Bedloe's Island, hot dogs, Grand Canyon, Rhapsody in Blue,
Chautauqua, P.T.A., Golden Gate, Rose Bowl or Wagon Train."'
21 Justice Brown felt that the wife's expenses should also be deductible because the
company expected the insurance agent to bring his wife with him. ". . .when the
employer beckons, the wife must respond." Patterson v. Thomas, supra note 1, at 120. In
addition, he felt attendance by the wife would provide her with vital information of the
company and her husband's business.
For two reasons, it would seem that the majority of the court was correct in not
allowing her expenses to be deducted. First, only the husband, not his spouse, could
deduct the latter's expenses, since she was not engaged in a trade or business under Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). Therefore, when the court disallowed the man's expenditures,
it followed that his wife's could not be included as a business expense. Secondly, even
if the husband's costs were allowed as a deduction, her expenses should have been dis-
allowed because her presence served no bona fide business purpose. See Treas. Reg.
1.162-2(c) (1958); Ralph E. Duncan, 30 T.C. 386 (1958); Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16
Tax Ct. Mem. 1081 (1957); Sax, "A Wife's Traveling Expenses," 37 Taxes 595 (1959).
22 Treas. Reg. 1.162-1(a) (1958); Treas. Reg. 1.162-2(d) (1958); Commissioner v.
Flowers, supra note 8.
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Certainly this remote connection does not sufficiently prove that the primary
purpose of the trip was business rather than pleasure.
If mandatory attendance at the convention is significant at all, it
seemingly is more important in determining whether the taxpayer should be
required to include the cost as income in the first place. Although the court
held that the trip was income, this may now appear unjust because of the lack
of choice the taxpayer had in making the trip. He may have had no desire
to vacation in New York City; perhaps he was saving money for a holiday
elsewhere. But because of the court's decision, his cash reserves or savings
may have to be spent in taxes to pay for his forced compensation. Normally,
a person who receives a non-cash benefit, such as property, can sell or trade
it. Thus, the inclusion as income seems justified. However, the fact that this
taxpayer received a benefit in such a form that it could not be resold and
that the resulting tax must come out of other assets, did not influence the
court's decision.2 3
By itself, however, the commanded appearance by an employer can
hardly change the cost of a trip for personal enjoyment into an ordinary and
necessary business expense. If such reasoning were followed, all an employer
would have to do if he wanted to give his employees a non-taxable bonus,
would be to require them to attend a city or resort area under the pretext
that it is for a business convention. This would provide yet another loop-
hole in business expense deductions.2 4 In the area of traveling, entertain-
ment, and convention expenses, the Government has lost revenue because
many taxpayers have devised means of writing off personal expenses as busi-
ness expenses. In the last few years, the President,25 the Secretary of the
Treasury,2 6 and officials of the Internal Revenue27 have spoken increasingly
23 Accord, United States v. Drescher, supra note 2. But see Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 213 (1920) where Justice Pitney, in deciding that stock dividends were not
income under the sixteenth amendment of the Constitution, stated, "Yet, without selling,
the shareholder, unless possessed of other resources, has not the wherewithal to pay an
income tax upon the dividend stock."
The taxpayer in the Patterson case, supra note 1, at 111, argued that the "sums
[paid by the company] come within the rule of Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930),
and are not income to him since he had no 'command' over them and was not free to
expend them in any manner he saw fit." The court answered that a benefit in a form
other than cash may be classified as income.
24 The remarks of Justice Van Oosterhout, when determining whether a certain
type of expenditure was a business expense, are appropriate: "An allowance of this type
would open the door to many questionable deductions. Such a deduction should be
allowed, if at all, only upon a clear showing that an item of necessary and ordinary
business expense has been proved." Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947, 955
(8th Cir. 1956).
25 107 Cong. Rec. 5992 (H. Doc. No. 140, 87 Cong.).
26 House Ways and Means Committee, H. Doc. No. 140, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961).
27 IR-Circ. No. 57-85, June 20, 1957, 575 CCH II 6585. This publication deals with
deductions of personal trips to cities and resorts under the guise of business trips. Rev.
Rul. 59-316, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 57; Rev. Rul. 60-16, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 58; I.R.S. News
Rel. No. IR-394, August 3, 1961, 617 CCH ff 6487.
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on the many abuses that have developed through the use of the expense
account. Certainly the present decision goes a long way in preventing personal
expenses from being taken as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The
line is now more clearly drawn between a convention trip for business and one
for pleasure purposes.
28
28 See also A. P. Reed, supra note 8, another recent decision denying the taxpayer
convention expenses because the trip was of a personal nature.
